BYU Law Review
Volume 1995 | Issue 2

5-1-1995

The Church-State Situation in Poland After the
Collapse of Communism
Krystyna Daniel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Krystyna Daniel, The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 401 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1995/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 3

The Church-State Situation in Poland Alter the
Collapse of Communism
Krystyna Daniel*
The changes and developments spawned by the political
transition period in Poland not only reached governmental
heights but also extended into the religious realm, particularly
affecting the Catholic Church. This paper will describe the
changed situation of the Catholic Church in Poland after the
June 1989 transitional period and will also explore underlying
explanations of the changes.
Without doubt, two things that catch our attention when
we focus on the Catholic Church in Poland after the communist
collapse are the significant reinforcement of its legal position
on one hand and the significant decrease in its prestige in
Polish society on the other. The reinforced legal position may
be expected, especially in a country with a notable Catholic
tradition where the Church experienced significant limitations
under communism.' However, the loss of prestige is surprising
and raises many questions.
In order to gain the perspective necessary to explain the
position of the Catholic Church in contemporary Poland, I
would like to begin with some basic information. Poland has
generally been recognized as a profoundly Catholic country
with a highly legitimized position of the Church. The idea that
Poland is a very Catholic country, one deeply rooted in Polish
culture, is based on two main facts. First, Poland has a long
historical experience with Catholicism dating back to the Tenth
Century, when, in 966, the Polish ruler Prince Mieszko I
*

Doctor of Law; Faculty of Law, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.

1. Nevertheless, the oppression of the Church in Poland between 1945 and
1989, however hard, was not nearly as drastic as that in the other communist
countries: for example, in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Romania, many church

buildings were destroyed, closed or turned into museums, storehouses or factories;
religious worship and entrance to seminaries were limited and controlled by the
4 THE HISTORY
OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH132-33, 138-48
state. See M. BANASZAK,
(Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, Warszawa 1992).
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adopted Christianity and Poland formally became a part of
Christian E ~ r o p e Second,
.~
the Catholic Church is, and always
has been, the predominant denomination in the country.
Indeed, at present, 95% of the entire population is C a t h ~ l i c . ~
Poland is currently one of the most monoethnic countries in
Europe. Poland has also never been so ethnically homogenous.
According to the most recent data, ethnic minorities, such as
Germans, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, constitute no more
than 3 t o 4% of Poland's population.' However, there has
always been a Polish, as well as a Catholic, majority. For
example, in 1931, Poles made up only 69.9% of the whole
population, while 13.9% were Ukrainians, 8.6% were Jews,
3.2% were Germans, and 3.1% were B y e l o ~ s s i a n s . The
~
dominant majority of these ethnic minorities in Poland consists
of non-Catholics.
Traditionally, it has been counter-intuitive to think about
Poles who do not belong to the Catholic Church; membership in
the Church was, and still is, perceived as one of the most
important features of belonging to the Polish nation. In fact,
the stereotypical expression "Pole-Catholic" appears to be
deeply rooted in the national consciousness. A 1994 survey
shows that for 55% of Poles, membership in the Catholic
Church is perceived as an important criterion for belonging to
the Polish n a t i o d
Another factor that contributes to the strong position of the
Catholic Church in Poland is connected with historical events.
2. The adoption of Christianity by Prince Mieszko I in 966 was preceded by
his marriage to Catholic Princess Dobrawa from Bohemia in 965. See A. ZAMOYSKI,
THE POLISHWAY:A THOUSAND-YEAR
HISTORYOF POLESAND THEIRCULTURE10
(1994).
UR@ STATYSTYCZNY
[THEL1TI'I.X YEAR-BOOK
OF STATISTICS] 54
3. GE~WNY
(Warszawa 1992).
4. In Poland there are 350,000-500,000 Germans, 2,000-250,000 Ukrainians,
200,000-250,000 ByelorussiadWhite Russians, about 25,000 Romans, 20,000-25,000
Lithuanians, 25,000 Slovaks, no more than 15,000 Jews, 10,000-12,000 Russians,
8,000 Ormians, and 30,00040,000 Czechs; altogether 1,200,000-1,700,000 people.
This data is based on the Report of the Office for Studies and Expert Evidence of
the Office of the Seym; hdziiiski, The Policy of the Polish State Toward Ethnic
Minorities in 1989-93 (January 1994) (unpublished report).
POLAND. FACTS,FIGURES
5. B. OLSZEWICZ,THE PICTUREOF CONTEMPORARY
AND TABLES(Warszawa 1938); J. TOMASZEWSKI,
THE ETHNICMINOR~~IES
IN POLAND
IN XX C E ~ (Warszawa
Y
1993).
6. The results of these polls have been met with Catholic Church approval
and with some concern among Protestants. See the comments upon the polls by T.
Pieronek, Bishop of the Catholic Church, and B. Trand, pastor of the EvangelicalSeptember 8-9, 1994, at 17.
Reformed Church, GAZETAWYBORCZA,

4011

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND

Through the ages, the Church senred not only as a religious
institution but also as a significant national icon, especially
when Polish political institutions were weakened. This was
particularly true when Poland lost its political independence
during the 123-year period that began with its partition among
Austria, Prussia, and Russia and ended in 1918, when Poland
regained its independence following World War I.? The Church
gained strong legitimization during World War I1 and during
communism, when the Polish government and other state
institutions were controlled by the Soviet Union. In turn,
governmental institutions were held in low esteem by Polish
so~iety.~
During communism in Poland, the Catholic Church, in
spite of numerous abridgements, enjoyed some level of
autonomy, especially in comparison with other countries under
Soviet d~mination.~
For example, in communist Poland, until
1961, religious classes were not excluded from public
school^.'^ Even more significant is the fact that the Catholic
Church received financial aid from the communist state when
the state supported one university-level Catholic school and
paid salaries for teachers of religious classes (since 1961).
Additional Christian denominations also received support
through the Church's Fund." It is clear that communist
authority could not entirely neglect the profound religious, as
well as cultural and national, feelings of the Poles. During that
time, the Church was the only institution that could openly
criticize the communist government and intercede for the

7 . See J. KLOCZOWSKI ET AL., THE OUTLINE OF THE HISTORYOF THE
CATHOLIC
CHURCHIN POLAND 235-54 (Znak, Krak6w 1986).
8. Id. at 362-70, 474-508.
9. Id. at 384. The significant level of the Church's autonomy was connected
on the one hand with the treaty signed between the Church and the Government
on April 14, 1950, and on the other hand with the uncompromising attitude of the
Polish Primate Stefan Wyszyhski, who opposed the increased control over the
Church imposed by the state in 1953.
10. The religious classes were expelled from public schools on the basis of the
Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of 1961, Dziennik Ustaw
Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej [Government Regulations and Laws Gazette of
the Polish People's Republic] [hereinafter DzU PRLI No. 32, item 160, art. 2. Since
1961, religious teaching has been held in the Church's buildings and other places,
outside the public schools' premises.
11. The state paid for the Academy of Catholic Theology and the non-Catholic
Christian Academy of Theology. See M. PIE-,
THE ECCLESIASTICAL
LAW 172-73
(Warszawa, PWN 1993).
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oppressed. For example, it was the Church that actively and
successfully opposed nationalization of private farms.12
As communism weakened, the Church concentrated large
groups of society around itself-not just practicing Catholics,
but skeptical intellectuals and non-believers as well. A strong
and visible collaboration was especially evident during the
"Solidarity period."13 Particularly, the last decade of the
communist regime may be viewed as one of religious upheaval
and increasing cooperation between the Catholic ecclesiastical
institutions and society. During this period the notion of the
universal Church, comprised not only of its hierarchy and
clergy in general but also of the believers at large, became true
as never before. The Church unified and consolidated the
society in the struggle against communism, and in 1989, when
communism collapsed, the Church was the unquestioned moral
authority in society. Consequently, communist Poland seemed
to be one of the last European bastions of deep and authentic
religiosity.14
The new realities considerably changed the legal position
of the Catholic Church in Poland. First of all, the postcommunist government adopted several laws that not only
strengthened the autonomy of the Church in relation to the

12. Poland was the only country in the communist block where private
farming was preserved, although the attempt to socialize private farms was
undertaken twice: between 1949 and 1956 and again in the seventies. See J.
KUBIN, THE COMMUNISTSIN THE POLISH COUNTRY 19-26, 48-49 (Wydawnictwo
MySli Nieinternowanej 1988).
13. The Independent Autonomous Labor Union "Solidarity" was established
between July 30 and September 31, 1980, was registered on November 10, 1980,
was delegalized on December 13, 1981, and was again registered on October 8,
1982. Solidarity gathered over 10 million members and was more than simply a
THE POLISHWAY: A THOUSAND-YEAR
HISTORYOF
labor union. See A. ZAMOYSKI,
POLESAND THEIR CULTURE390-96 (1994) (discussing the connections between the
Church and "Solidarity"); P. NITECKI, THE CHURCH,"SOLIDARITYn AND A SOCIAL
REVIVALIN POLAND(OPTIMUS, Warszawa 1991); J. WCZOWSKI,supra note 7, a t
SOLIDARITY
412-13 (Znak, Krak6w 1886); T. GARTONASH, THE POLISHREVOLUTION,
1980-1981 108-09 Wydawnictwo Krqg, Warszawa 1987).
14. See J. Zakowski, The Two Churches or Catho-Right, Catho-Left and CathoNeurosis, GAZETAWYBORCZA,
May 16, 1993, a t 10-11. In this article, the author
shows the relations between the Church, society, and authority under and after
communism. According to the author, the Church's struggle with communism did
not reveal its internal divisions, such as the division between integristic and open
Catholicism on one hand and conservative and liberal Catholicism on the other. I t
was the collapse of communism that showed that the Church in Poland is quite
differentiated and quite far from unity.
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state, but also introduced Christian values into the axiological
base of the new, democratic system of law.
A very brief look a t the current law in Poland fkom the
viewpoint of its reference to the Catholic Church must begin
with the Polish Constitution.15 The Constitution of 1952,
which is still in effect, propounds general regulations
concerning church-state relations and religious freedom. An
examination of the constitution leads to the conclusion that
Poland is an ideologically neutral country.16 Article 82
declares church-state separation while simultaneously granting
free exercise of religious function." The same article also
grants freedom of consciousness and creed? Additionally,
Article 82 states that a church-state relationship can be
determined only by statutory law.'' Article 81 of the
constitution assures the equality of conscience and creed.20
It is also worth mentioning, however, that the Polish
Constitution dates back to the communist period and therefore
suffers by its association with communism. However, it is the
first Polish Constitution to guarantee church-state separation
as well as equal recognition of all denominations. Interestingly,
previous Polish Constitutions, those of 1791;' 1921:~ and
1 9 3 5 , ~in
~ contrast with the Constitution of 1952, were
adopted in a democratic way, yet they established a privileged
position for the Catholic Church through primam inter
pares.24
The Constitution of 1952 contains only general provisions
and, therefore, requires other, more specific, regulations. In the

15. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland [hereinafter RP Const.],
adopted in July 22, 1952 as the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic
[hereinafter PRL Const.], was amended many times: in 1976, 1980, 1982, 1983,
1987, 1988, 1989 (twice), 1990 (three times), 1991 (twice), and 1992 (twice).
16. R.P. Const. art. 82, 1 2.
17. R.P. Const.
18. R.P. Const.
19. R.P. Const.
20. R.P. Const.
21. Constitution of May 3, 1791, entered to the book of the city of Warsaw
on May 5, 1791.
22. Constitution of March 17, 1921, Dziennik Ustaw Republiki Polskiej
[Government Regulations and Laws Gazette of the Republic of Poland] [hereinafter
DzU RPI No. 44, item 267.
23. Constitution of April 23, 1935, DzU RP No. 30, item 223.
24. Art. 114 and art. 120 of the Constitution of March 17, 1921, introduced
the obligatory religious classes into the public school system (including religious
classes for non-believers).
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absence of such regulation, the constitutional provisions can
easily be manipulated in the process of interpretation or
application. Importantly, the same constitution with the same
provisions concerning church-state relations was in force under
communism; however, those provisions were somewhat illusory
because of lack of more specific regulation^.^'
Substantial changes arrived in May 1989, less than one
month before the collapse of communism. The Polish
Parliament adopted three statutes that gave more specific
church-state regulations: the Statute on Freedom of
Consciousness and
the Statute on Social Insurance of
Clergy~nen,~~
and the Statute on the Relationship Between
the Catholic Church and the State.28 In the following years,
Parliament also passed individual regulations concerning the
legal position of other major denominations in Poland.29
The limited framework of this paper does not allow me to
present and analyze the entire scope of the legal regulations
concerning Polish church-state relations generally or the
position of the Catholic Church specifically. Instead, I will focus
on the most general, as well as the most controversial,
regulations.
Generally, the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and
Creed, while possessing the character of a lex generalis, gave
force to broad constitutional problems regarding religious
freedom and freedom of conviction. Additionally, it defined the
basic relationship between church and state. In particular,
Article 2 of the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed
precisely defines the meaning of freedom of consciousness and

25. See PIETRZAK,
supra note 11, a t 164.
26. Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, DzU
PRL No. 29, item 155.
27. Statute on Social Insurance of Clergyman of May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No.
29, item 156.
28. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154.
29. Individual statutes that regulating relations between the state and
particular churches have been adopted for the Polish Orthodox Church, Statute on
the Relationship Between the Polish Orthodox Church and the State of July 4,
1991, DzU RP No. 66, item 287; for the Evangelical-Augsburg's Church, Statute on
the Relationship Between the Evangelical-Augsburg's Church and the State of
March 25, 1994, DzU RP No. 73, item 323; and for the Evangelical-%formed
Church, Statute on the Relationship Between the Evangelical-Reformed Church and
the State of March 25, 1994, DzU RP No.73, item 324. Drafts of three other
statutes have been prepared: for the Methodist Church, the Baptist Church, and
the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
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creed. This article states that all citizens can form churches of
other denominations, participate in religious holidays, preach
their religion or share their conviction, raise children according
to their own beliefs, keep silent in matters concerning their
religion and personal convictions, maintain contacts with coreligionists, acquire religious information, produce and
purchase objects relating to their religious sect, and associate
At
in secular organizations to promote religious con~ictions.~~
the same time, another article of the statute states there are to
be no state endowments or subsidies for churches.31 However,
there is also a provision that allows financial aid to churches
according to specific regulation^.^^ Thus the statutes begin to
more narrowly define the constitutional clauses relating to
religion. Finally, Article 11.1 establishes the autonomous
character of churches and denominations, while in Article 11.3,
churches and other denominations are granted the right to
undertake action before the Constitutional T r i b ~ n a l . ~ ~
As mentioned above, the legal position of the Catholic
Church, as well as the position of some other major
denominations in Poland, is ultimately regulated by specific
statutes that have the character of lex specialis in relation to
the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed and to the
constitutional law.34 Analyzing the ecclesiastical law in
Poland reveals four levels of legal regulation: (1) the
constitution; (2) a general statutory regulation that refers to all
churches and denominations; (3) the individual statutory
regulation that refers to the particular churches and
denominations; and (4) other lower ranking regulations such as
administrative orders, instructions or circular letters.
The legal position of the Catholic Church is presently
founded on a statute.35 The statute guarantees the wide
autonomy and self-government of the Church. For example, the
statute grants the Church the right to exclusively recall its

30. Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, DzU

RP No. 29, item 155.
31. Id. art. 10, 'g2,cl. 1.
32. Id. art. 10, 'j[ 2, cl. 2.
33. Id. art. 11, 'j[ 2.
34. The law that has the character of lex specialis includes the individual
statutes adopted for particular churches. See supra note 29.
35. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154. See specifically art. 2.
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f u n ~ t i o n a r i e s It
. ~ ~also contemplates guarantees for direct as
well as indirect financial aid:'
which include support for
educational and charitable activities performed by the
The statute establishes numerous tax and custom
exceptions such as the income tax, property tax, and
community tax3' The statute also regulates the wide scope of
Church property re~titution.~'The state also bears a
substantial part of insurance of clergy4' The next important
element to notice is the provision of article 19.2 of the statute
regulating the relationship between the Church and state
where expresis verbis allows religious education in public
schools. This provision was added September 7, 1991:~
following the decision passed by the Constitutional Tribunal on
J a n u a r y 30, 1 9 9 1 , ~ ~
t h a t confirmed the legality of
implementing religious education in the public school system.
In spite of the Constitutional Tribunal decision, the law
introducing religious classes to public school was in conflict
with several legal regulations, including the Statute on
Education and the constitutional principle of church-state
separation?
Relevant to the law that regulates public religious
education are article 12.1 of the Statute on E d u ~ a t i o nand
~~

36. Id. arts. 13 and 14.
37. Id.
38. Id. arts. 21, 22, and 40, P 4.
39. Id. arts. 55 and 56.
40. Id. arts. 60-70 with amendments of September 16, 1991, DzU RP No.
107, item 459.
41. The Statute on Social Insurance of Clergyman of May 17, 1989 DzU PRL
No. 29 item 156, arts. 28 and 29.
42. Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154 (amended September 7, 1991, DzU RP
No. 95, item 425).
43. Case No. K.11190 T.C.
44. The religious classes were introduced into the public school system on the
basis of the instructions enacted by the Minister of Education on August 3 and 24,
1990. The Polish Ombudsman brought action against these instructions to the
Constitutional Tribunal. The Constitutional Tribunal, in a ruling in January 1991,
upheld the legality of these instructions. However, the tribunal recommended
changing the Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of July 15,
1961, DzU PRL No. 32, item 160, wherein art. 2 was a provision about secular
education. Consequently, other amendments were introduced to the Statute on
Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of May 17, 1989, and to the Statute on the
Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of May 17, 1989. Both
amendments were adopted on September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 425.
45. The Statute on Education of September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item
425.
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the administrative order enacted by the Minister of Education
in April 1 9 9 2 ~ that
~
finally specified the way and the
conditions of religious teaching in public s~hools.~'
Despite the
obvious constitutional principle of church-state separation, the
preamble to the Statute on Education of 1991 indicates that
Christian values should be respected in the process of
education.48This is worth mentioning because the contents of
the preamble are significant for the interpretation of the
statute. The Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting, adopted
January 29, 1992, requires respect of Christian values in public
broadcasting." Also, a recent law5' introduced severe
limitations on abortion; although there is no direct reference to
Christian values in the language of this law, it is a law
justified by Christian values.51
There are some significant signs that the strong and
previously autonomous Church is becoming entangled with the
46. The Administrative Order of the Minister of Education on the Conditions
and Way of Organizing Religious Education in Public Schools of April 14, 1992,
DzU RP No. 36, item 155 (amended August 23, 1993, DzU RP No. 83, item 390).
47. The Statute on Development of Education and Upbringing of July 15,
1961, DzU PRL No. 32, item 160, was replaced by the Statute of Education of
September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item 425. Also, the instructions of August 3
and 24, 1990, were replaced by an administrative order of April 14, 1991, which
specifically regulates religious teaching in public schools.
On August 19, 1992, the Ombudsman brought an action against this
administrative order before the Constitutional Tribunal on the basis of infringement
of the constitutional principle of church-state separation. According to the
Ombudsman, the order violated the law, including the constitution (arts. 81.1 and
82.1), the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed of 1989, and later
amendments to that statute (arts. 2.5, 20.2, 10.2, and art. 5.2), and the Statute on
the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of 1989, and later
amendments to that statute (art. 18.3). The Constitutional Tribunal, in its sentence
No. U.12192, passed on April 20, 1993, generally recognized the legality of the
order. However, it challenged the provision of article 3.3 that obligates parents who
do not want religious classes for their children to declare this decision to the
school authority, and it challenged the provision of article 12 that allows prayer
and placing of religious symbols in classrooms.
48. The Statute on Education of September 7, 1991, DzU RP No. 95, item
425.
49. The Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting of January 29, 1992, DzU RP
No. 7, item 34, arts. 18.2 and 21.2. The Polish Ombudsman brought action against
these provisions, but the Constitutional Tribunal confirmed the provisions' legality
in its decision No. AK K.17/93 of June 7, 1994.
50. The Statute on Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection and Conditions
for Possibility of Abortion of January 7, 1993, DzU RP No. 17, item 78.
51. In article 7, the anti-abortion law of January 7, 1993, permits abortion
only when the life of a woman is in danger or her health is severely threatened,
when the fetus is severely and irreversibly damaged, or when a pregnancy is
caused by rape or incest.
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state. The legal position of the Catholic Church in Poland is
also regulated by the Concordat that was signed between the
Broadly, a Concordat
Holy See and Poland on July 28, 1993.~~
constitutes a bilateral treaty concluded between the Holy See
and a particular state.53 The bilateral character of this
regulation usually allows the Church to obtain additional
prerogatives. In the Polish case, the general objective of the
Concordat seems to be establishing the entanglement between
the Church and state as well as strengthening the position of
the Church by allowing it to influence or even determine the
This intention is
content of the new Polish Con~titution.~~
more than clear if we consider the fact that the present
constitution will likely be superseded; the Constitution of 1952,
however significantly changed after the collapse of communism
and supplemented by the so-called Small Constitution of 1992,
is seen symbolically as a communist one.55
The current Constitution of 1952 guarantees church-state
separation, but the new constitutional drafts, submitted to the
Parliament, are not compatible with each other in the area of
church-state relations. In several of the drafts the neutral
position of the state is preserved, but in others the Catholic
Church holds a privileged position,56 and no clear separation
between church and state exists. For example, the presidential

52. Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland, signed on
July 28, 1993 by Mr. K. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Ireland and the Reverend J. Kowalczyk, the Apostolic Nuncio, in Warsaw
[hereinafter Concordat]. The Concordat will become effective after ratification,
anticipated in the near future.
53. A concordat is a generous agreement of international law, concluded
between the Holy See and a particular country. See J. WISLOCKI, THE POLISH
CONCORDAT
OF 1993: YES OR NO? (Kantor Wydawniczy S A W , Poznan 1993).
54. For example, article 12 of the Concordat confirms setting up religious
teaching in all public schools. An especially inexplicit provision of article 12
provides that all public schools may "organize according to the will of the
interested persons the teaching of religion in the framework of the plan of school
and kindergarten classes."
55. The so-called Small Constitution was adopted on October 17, 1992, DzU
RP No. 84, item 426. It concerns the relationship between the legislative and
executive powers and self-government in Poland. It is worth noting that Poland is
the only post-communist country that did not adopt a new democratic constitution.
As a recent poll shows, a majority of Poles (74%) recognize the great importance of
March 5, 1994, a t
adopting a new constitution. CBOS Survey of 1994, POL=,
13.
56. See THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DRAFTS 1989-1991 Wydawnictwo Sejmowe,
Warszawa 1992), and the comparison of the seven constitutional drafts presented
September 22, 1994, at 5.
in GAZETA WYBORCZA,
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control draft and the draft submitted by the Senate allow the
~ ~ other
Concordat to establish church-state r e g ~ l a t i o n ,and
drafts do not require ratification of the Concordat treaty with
the Holy See. However, the draft submitted by the postcommunist Alliance of the Democratic Left, which has been the
biggest political group in Parliament since September 1993,
openly declares the secular character of the state?
The Concordat of 1993 sends a clear message of the
growing involvement of state institution in religious action. For
example, the Concordat not only endorses some state
obligations derived fkom existing law, but also expands them.
These include, among others, state aid for religious schools at
the university level5' and expanding support for maintaining
buildings belonging to the Chur~h.~'Article 12.1 of the
Concordat excludes the right of adult students to decide
whether to take religious classes, a privilege they presently
enjoy? Nevertheless, possibly the most startling point of this
treaty is the proposed relation of the Church to the existing
legal order. First, no provision exists requiring the Church to
respect the existing law, specifically the constitutional order.62
This is of great significance, especially considering the fact that
the provision of the Statute on the Relationship Between the
Catholic Church and the State that stated "the Catholic Church
in the Republic of Poland acts within the framework of the
Constitutional order"63 was removed by amendment in
September 1991.~~
Second, the Concordat introduces some provisions that are
entirely inconsistent with existing law, particularly regulations

57. See the comparison of the seven constitutional drafts presented in GAZETA
WYBORCZA,
September 22, 1994, a t 5.
58. Id.
59. Concordat art. 14, ¶ 3. The text of the Concordat is published in P.
KUGLARZ& F. ZOLL, THE CONCORDAT
MARRIAGE
73-85 (Staromiejska Oficyna
Wydawnicza, Krakow 1994).
60. Concordat art. 22, ¶ 4.
61. Id. art. 12.
62. Such obligation was provided in the Concordat concluded between the
Holy See and Poland in 1925. See WISKOCKI,supra note 53. In article one of the
Concordat there is only one provision about mutual independence and autonomy of
the Church and state.
63. Statute on Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State of
May 17, 1989, DzU PRL No. 29, item 154, art. 1.
64. Amendment of September 11, 1991, DzU RP 107, item 459, changed
article one of this statute to read "The Catholic Church acts in the Republic of
Poland in Each of its Rites."
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referring to canon law matrimony," and goes so far as to call
for essential changes in marital law.66
In summary, it appears that the law adopted following the
fall of communism not only significantly strengthens the
position of the Catholic Church, but it also indicates a gradual
inclusion of Christian values in the axiological base of the
changing legal system.
It may be valuable, at this point, to emphasize that, with
regard to the shape of a new constitution, the Church openly
calls for a constitutional acknowledgment of an ideologically
neutral state, not a secular one, on the one hand, and for
acknowledgment of the right of an unborn child to life, based
on religious grounds, on the other hand. With the Church
actively voicing its opinion on unborn children, it appears
unlikely that such a provision will be overlooked. The
implications and importune of the provision are significant and
obvious in the future con~titution.~~
History is full of the "coup de theater." For everybody who
follows the changes that have been taking place after the
collapse of communism, it is clear that the Catholic Church in
Poland, despite new regulations that strengthen its legal
position, is undergoing a very difficult period, involving
numerous serious and unprecedented challenges.
The significant decline of social confidence towards the
Church and its hierarchy in the years immediately following
the collapse of communism cannot escape notice. Evidence of
the decline is found in the decreasing number of people who
claimed confidence in the Church; the number dropped quickly
below fifty percent by the end of November 1 9 9 2 . ~This
~
illustrates a rather dramatic decrease when compared with the
pre-collapse number of ninety percent who felt confidence in
the Church?'
One conclusion that emerges almost immediately from
examining this data, is that the decreasing prestige of the

65. Concordat arts. 10 and 11.
66. See WISLOCKI, supra note 53, at 131-41. According to current Polish law,
religious marriage does not cause any legal consequences.
67. See the letter of the Polish Episcopacy on the Constitution, 272
Conference of Polish Episcopacy, Niepokalanow, September 22, 1994. GAZETA
WYBORCZA, September 25, 1994, at 9.
68. OBOP polls conducted between 1989 and 1994, GAZETA W ~ O R C Z A ,
September 20, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter OBOP polls].
69. Id.
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Church in Polish society is connected directly with legal
decisions concerning the position of the Church in the state.
Many of these changes, and even some proposals pre-dating the
changes, generated a strong social reaction not only in
deliberations of law professors and politicians but also in public
opinion." The first serious indication of tension in the
relationship between the Church and the society began in 1990,
with the controversial and unexpected decision to bring
religious education to public schools;?' that was followed by
the implementation of the provision regarding respect for
Christian values in radio and television broadcasting in
1 9 9 2 . ~These
~
actions were quickly followed by a significant
limitation on the freedom of abortion in the beginning of
1 9 9 3 , ~and
~ finally by the Concordat signed in the middle of
1993.~"Additionally, another significant fact to be mentioned
here is related to the involvement of the Church in the
presidential election a t the end of 1 9 9 0 , ~and
~
the
parliamentary election in September 1991.~~
Tliis significant
increase in negative attitude towards the Church is obviously
connected with lack of approbation for active, political
involvement of clergy. An examination of the national data
gathered in 1991 reveals that, in spite of an overwhelming
majority of Catholics, 74% of the entire population did not
approve of the political activity of the C h ~ r c h . 'A
~ high level
of criticism of the Church's involvement in politics has been
maintained consistently in the years that followed.78 In July
70. Id.
71. Religious education was brought to public schools based on Instructions of
August 3 and 24, 1990, enacted by the Ministry for Education.
72. Arts. 18.2 and 21.2 of the Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting of
December 29, 1992, DzU RP No. 7, item 34.
73. Statute on Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection and Conditions for
Abortion of January 7, 1993, DzU RP No. 17, item 58.
74. Concordat.
75. The Church supported L. Walesa in the first turn of the presidential
election held on November 11, 1990. The Church gave Walesa even stronger
support in the second turn on December 9, 1990, when S. Tyminski was Walesa's
opponent.
76. During the electoral campaign in 1991, Bishop J. Michalik, from
Gorzowska diocese, openly called upon his believers to vote for Catholics: "the
Catholic is obliged to vote for Catholic, Christian for Christian, Moslem for
Moslem, Jew for Jew, Mason for Mason, and Communist for Communist." Z.
Nosowski, The Church and the Election, GAZETAWYBORCZA,February 22, 1992, a t
10.
77. OBOP polls, supra note 68.
78. For example, in March 1992 more than 80% of Polish society did not
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of 1994, almost 70% of respondents openly declared that the
Catholic Church in Poland should not actively influence
politic^.'^ Additionally, in the answers given in 1993, there
was a clear conviction of the importance of maintaining
separation between the Church and state; the majority of
respondents declared that the Church should not influence the
election of persons to public office, and the state should not
involve itself in the internal affairs of the Church by doing
such things as influencing the selection of Church official^.^^
This attitude was accompanied by low approval of religious
classes in the public schools with less than forty percent of the
respondents approving, without any reservation, the Church's
teaching in public schools.81 There was also a strong
conviction that the public schools' curriculum should be
established without any participation of the Church hierarchy,
while the teaching of religion should remain exclusively in the
domain of families and churches.82 In contrast, according to
the majority of respondents, the Church did not devote enough
attention to fighting the negative phenomena of social life such
as alcoholism, drug addiction, and i n t o l e r a n ~ e .All
~ ~ this
indicates that a dominant part of Polish society, in the
transitional period after communism, appears to uniformly
support a liberal model of the state with clear church-state
separation.
A discussion of additional relevant historical and sociopolitical factors is necessary to establish the perspective needed
to explain this dramatic shift that occurred in post-communist
Poland. The first factor I would like to examine, as well as
challenge, is what I call the myth of Polish religiosity,
including the strong attachment to the Church that was
mentioned above.
Many polls confirm that while Polish churches are still full
of Sunday churchgoers, especially when compared to other
Western European countries, the society as a whole is
becoming more secular. Some of the latest polls reveal that

approve political involvement of the Church. Sopocka Pracownia Badan
May 10, 1992.
Spolecznych, GAZETAWYBORCZA,
79. Exactly 69% of the population. OBOP polls, supra note 68.
80. Id.
81. CBOS polls conducted in May 1992, GAZETAWYBORCZA,
May 27, 1992,
at 2.
82. Id.
83. OBOP polls published in GAZETAWYBORCZA,
May 27, 1992, at 2.
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only 56% of those who consider themselves Catholics regularly
attend religious s e ~ c e s . " The same data show that people
with elementary and secondary education take part in regular
religious s e ~ c e smore fkequentlf5 than those with a
graduate level e d u c a t i ~ n .The
~ ~ devoutly religious are most
likely to be elderly, rural, and female.87 The increasing
number of divorces and abortions performed prior to the
passage of the 1993 abortion law serves as an illustration of
diminishing religiosity in Poland; both practices are contrary to
express Church dogma.88The new law reduced legal abortions
significantly and raised varied reactions. According to a very
recent survey, only 32% of the whole population supports a new
anti-abortion regulation and 52% call for more liberal
regulations that allow the performance of abortions on social
grounds.89Another national survey revealed that 59% of the
population believes that the Catholic Church should allow
people to divorce.g0
A new attitude toward religion is developing, possibly
The ideology of the
leading to the privatization of religi~n.~'
individual is increasingly different fkom that of the Church.
From this perspective, Poland is not so exceptional when
compared with other European countries.92 The process of
secularization in Poland has been delayed by certain episodes
84. OBOP polls, supra note 68.
85. Id. Sixty-nine percent of people with elementary and secondary education
regularly attend religious services.
86. Id. Only 37% of people with university education regularly attend
religious services.
87. Id. Seventy-one percent of people over 60 and 64% of women attend
religious services regularly.
88. Before 1993, according to the regulation of 1956, abortion in Poland was
available on demand. According to the Main Statistical Office (GUS), in 1980 there
were 33,800 divorces; in 1985, 49,100 divorces; and in 1990, 42,500 divorces.
GAZETAWYBORCZA,
August 22, 1994, at 4. According to Church doctrine, both
abortion and divorce are forbidden.
89. OBOP polls.
90. DEMOSKOP polls, GAZETA WYBORCZA,
August 22, 1994, a t 4.
91. Thomas Luckmann describes privatization of religion as "the most
revolutionary trait of modern society . . . . Each person selects a world of
significance fkom a variety of choices. The selection is based on consumer
preference which is determined by the social biography of the individual and
similar social biographies will result in similar choices." T. LUCKMANN,THE
INVISIBLE RELIGION:THE PROBLEMOF RELIGIONIN MODERNSOCIETY97 i 105
(1967) (quoting M.E. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC: THE AMERICAN
CDRCUMSTANCE
(1987)).
92. See R.P. McBrien, Roman Catholicism: E Pluribus Unum, in SPIRITUALITY
IN A SECULAR
AGE 179 (M. Douglas & S.M. Tipton, eds. 1983).
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in Polish history, such as the period of struggle with
communism and the time of partition, when Poland lost its
independence to orthodox Russia, Protestant Pmssia, and
Austria. Ironically, however, the historical position of the
Church as a substitute for the political institution, combined
with the Church's direction of society in its struggle for
freedom and democracy, actually contributed indirectly to the
process of secularization. As the Polish example demonstrates,
under communism, many of those who regularly joined the
religious service were paying more attention to what priests
were saying about the political situation than to the religious
preaching. And more importantly, the churchgoers heard what
they wanted to hear. Paradoxically, the Church, highly engaged
in a secular social, political, and quasi-political action, had
neglected its moral and spiritual activity, leading to its own
decline.
Additionally, the Church's position in Poland was not
always strong and stable. This was particularly evident during
times of political transition, including the period of communism
and the time when Poland lost its independence. Although
examples demonstrating the high prestige of the Church in
Polish society are easy to find, there are, nevertheless, periods
in Polish history when the Church lost its prestige among a
large part of the society. In the seventeenth century, the Polish
S e d 3 repeatedly forbade anyone to give a legate for the
benefit of the Church." When Poland emerged fi-om World
War I and created its sovereign and democratic political
institutions, the significant development of anti-clericalism was
spreading into society.95
The political climate was not the only factor that
influenced the increase of s e ~ u l a r i s m Among
.~~
other factors
contributing to the rise of secularization were the growth of
science and technology, the expansion of higher education, the

93. Seym is the lower house of the Polish Parliament.
94. J. Tazbir, The Fall of the State and the Glory of the Church, POLITYKA,
March 19, 1991, at 13.
YOUNG GENERATION
OF THE PEASANTS (PWN, Warsazwa
95. J. CHALASINSKI,
1938). In his empirical study, conducted before World War 11, F. Znaniecki notices
that a significant part of the citizens of Poznan "do not have any respect for clergy
as one should expect in such Catholic City as Poznan." F. ZNANIECKI,
THE CITY IN
THE CITIZENS'
CONSCIOUSNESS:
THE SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
ON POZNAN
CITY 372
(1931).
96. See J. Tazbir, supra note 94.
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growing acceptance of liberal values accompanied by a
permissive view on morality and sex, and, of course, the
growing role of the state.g7
Returning again to the historical background of churchstate-society relations in Poland, it is easy to discover the more
general tendency that indicates the dependence of the Church's
legitimation on the condition of the democratic state. Whenever
the Polish state went through a serious political crisis, and
thus was unable to create democratic institutions, the
significance of the Church rose, and society gathered itself
around her. The corollary is also true: the growing legitimation
of the democratic state has caused a decrease in the Church's
prominence among society.
The position of the Church in Polish society is attributable
to its political involvement. There are circumstances where this
political involvement is acceptable and anticipated and there
are also circumstances where the Church is expected to
significantly limit its activity in the political sphere. In Poland,
a significant part of society believes that the success of
democracy has created a strong need for church-state
separation and the depolitization of the Church's activity. Why?
To answer this question it is necessary to focus on two views of
the government and law: one attributable to the Catholic
Church, and the other characteristic of modem, liberal, and
pluralist democracy. Even a superficial look at both views
reveals the essential, although difficult to surmise, discrepancy.
The democratic concept of government and law is based on a
value of freedom. This value implicates rejection of any
totalitarian or paternalistic regime. In democracy there is only
one subject pf political power: a society, or more precisely a
majority of society. Society alone decides, according to
democratic procedural rules, its political institutions and the
content of its legal norms. In such a system, law and political
institutions have derived "from the bottom, according to the
will of those who are subjected to the state a~thority."~'
Conversely, for the Catholic Church, legitimation of the
government and law depends upon clearly defined transcendent
values as well as subordination to them. According to the
Church, these kinds of essential values and moral standards
97. R. WUTHNOW,
THE RESTRUCTURING
OF AMERICAN RELIGION
153-63 (1989).
98. E.W. Bockenforde, The Ethos of Modern Democracy and the Church, in
FREEDOM,
STATE,
CHURCH 26 (E. W. Bockenforde, ed., Znak, Krakow 1994).
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are universally valid and, therefore, cannot be subjected to the
democratic rules of negotiation and adjustment. The Catholic
position holds that these essential values and moral standards
must be adopted irrespective and independent of the opinion of
the majority. This, however, is irreconcilable with the basic
value of freedom and cannot be accepted by a society that
defines itself as a pluralist democracy.
The strong tension between the Church and society
resulting from the decision to teach religious classes in public
schools came not from the introduction of public religious
education itself but fiom the manner in which this decision was
made. It was a very low ranking law, enacted by the Ministry
of Education under the pressure of the Church." Additionally,
this law was in discrepancy with many other legal regulations,
despite amendments, there
including constitutional ones;''
are still some doubts concerning the constitutional provision on
church-state separation. Such a practice raises serious
reservations in a society building a democratic state in which
the legislature is expected to create law freely but in
accordance with the constitution.
Generally, there are at least two main ways in which
church-state relations can be shaped. Broadly speaking, in the
first case both institutions may preserve separation and full
autonomy simultaneously. In such a system the state
maintains religious and ideological neutrality, guaranteeing all
citizens equal position independent of their religious
convictions, and a church, in its activities for its believers,
cannot make use of any state institutions. In the second case,
there is not such a strict division between church and state,
and a church may exert a direct influence on citizens through
state structure. The second case raises a number of
reservations and controversies, mostly because non-believers, or
more often non-followers of the "privileged" church, will find it
difficult to recognize such a state as a c~mmonwealth.'~'
When analyzing the standard of the Polish law that was
passed after June 4, 1989, we come to the conclusion that the
method of regulating church-state relations in Poland has not

99. This decision was made by the Joint Commission, consisting of
representatives of the government and the Polish Episcopacy.
100. See PIETRW(, supra note 11, at 259.
101. See id., at 48-103; LOREN P. BETH,THE AMERICAN THEORY---CHURCHAND
STATE 145 (1959).
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yet been decided. However, a number of normative regulations
indicate a considerable departure from the separationist model
adopted in the United States and indicate an approach to a
model where there is a positive identification between church
and state.lo2 The inclusion of Christian values into the
axiological base of the legal system that was introduced under
the influence of the Church is cause for concern.
Undoubtedly, the prompt resort to Christian values, in a
legal system that has experienced forty-five years of
domination by communist law characterized not by ideological
neutrality but rather by the intention to limit religion and
church autonomy, was eagerly welcomed by the Church and
certain groups of the society. Nevertheless, a t the same time,
as shown by the results of surveys presented above, political
involvement of the Church and the tendency to implement
religious values into law are viewed by a large part of society
as a serious threat to a modem, pluralist democracy. As a
result of its political involvement, the Church is significantly
and rapidly losing its previously high prestige. This situation,
however, is not different from the general tendency found in
the history of Polish church-state relations. Briefly speaking,
the greatest opportunities were presented to the Church
whenever the state was in difficulty and could not create its
democratic institutions, but when the condition of the
democratic and pluralist state strengthened, the Church lost its
prominence.
Considering the present and the full political sovereignty of
the Third Republic of Poland, we should hope that society will
support a separation of church and state and that both society
and the Church will understand what Tocqueville understood
so well when he wrote that religion is strengthened, not
weakened, by the separation of church and state.lo3

102. On the subject of church-state relations models, see among others
PIETRZAK, supra note 11; and W. Cole Durham, A Comparative Framework for
Analyzing Religious Liberty, .in FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS AND
CONSTITUTION-WFUTING
IN POLAND(Leszek Lech Garlicki, ed., American Studies

Center, University of Warsaw, 1994).
103. A. TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA(1945).

